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Name: Hendrik Bicknäse Autor "Deutscharbeit - Mein Leben als Sohn"

Alethea Talks: Mr. Bicknäse, October 3, 2025 marks 35 years of German unity – a milestone that celebrates unity, but also highlights divisions. As someone who lived through the division of Germany, how do you reflect on the significance of this day today, both personally and for society?

According to a new survey, only 40 percent of Germans believe they can express their opinions freely. In a democracy, this should give the media cause for one special broadcast after another. Instead, every evening Germany discusses in the media the supposed or actual danger posed by the AfD. What is overlooked is the authoritarian danger posed by the “fight against the right.”

Germany has taken an authoritarian path in the fight against right-wing populism, which is on the rise globally. The Americans just recognized this earlier than many others. Anyone who thinks that such criticism only comes from the Trump camp should take a closer look: for example, at Bill Maher's late-night show. The comedian is by no means a mouthpiece for the Republicans; he regularly finds himself caught between all the political parties. He talks about the great importance of freedom of expression in the world. To prove how much it is in danger, he cited several examples. One of them comes from Germany, the country where even classic liberals no longer understand what is happening here in the boundless fight against “hate and incitement.”

In conversations with my relatives in Mecklenburg, I experience their incomprehension at what they see as a dishonest discussion about the AfD in the culture war. As if the AfD came out of nowhere. In the end, it is a symptom. I consider it deeply undemocratic to defame people who vote for the AfD because they no longer feel understood by the established parties as Nazis or right-wing extremists. These people, who currently make up 26 percent of the electorate, are dismissed as immoral per se. I consider this to be an extremely dangerous attitude and development. Most neighboring countries are seeing similar trends in terms of a shift to the right in the political landscape. However, there is no country in which exclusion acts as an invitation for the development of a humiliated party, in which it truly flourishes in its isolation and adorns itself with martyrdom as an alternative. On the contrary: in coalitions or agreements in neighboring Nordic countries, right-wing parties are held accountable and their growth is very specifically limited. People talk and work together! In my opinion, we were once closer to German unity, but unfortunately we have lost our course and orientation to forces that cultivate social envy as fanatics of equality.

As a writer and journalist, you experienced the post-war period and reunification from a critical perspective. What were your most troubling, but also your fondest memories?

The most serious early experience for me was my arrest for having contact with the East at the border with the former GDR. As a result, I was held in custody for a long period of time—three and a half months—in the Federal Republic of Germany in 1966 as a young adult, even though I had never done anything treasonous and was not accused of doing so. At that time, until 1968, the mere fact of having contact with the East was sufficient to prosecute “treasonous relations.” Soon after my sentence of 28 days of juvenile detention was announced in 1967 in a closed session—without taking into account the time I had already spent in pretrial detention! The preparations for immunity from prosecution were already underway by the then Federal Minister of Justice Heinemann when the verdict against me was announced. However, the older judges at the Higher Regional Court did not follow suit.

The new Ostpolitik in Willy Brandt's government was rejected by older senior judges, the same Higher Regional Court judges who had served their country loyally until 1945. The new Ostpolitik in Willy Brandt's government was rejected by older senior judges, the same Higher Regional Court judges who had served their state loyally until 1945.

“Until then, contact with official persons ‘over there’ in the GDR was not permitted.”

And this is my fondest memory: when Willy Brandt finally gained momentum in his new position. “Change through rapprochement,” as the new Ostpolitik was called at the time, was just beginning to appear on the horizon as a delicate political dawn. Until then, contact with official persons “over there” in the GDR was not permitted. With his policies, he broke down the barriers in Germany at the time and also gave his new policies legal validity.

Unfortunately, the victims of the Cold War in the West continue to be silenced – indeed, they have been almost forgotten. The judgments of the time, which tended toward secret justice, have remained a suppressed taboo subject to this day. There has never been any attempt to come to terms with the past. The judiciary in the “unjust state of the GDR,” on the other hand, has been repeatedly and loudly scandalized by the old Federal Republic since reunification in 1990, with the utmost moral superiority. The public media are not really fulfilling their role here. No one should be surprised that the process of East-West integration remains difficult and is proceeding only hesitantly and with resistance.

“I sometimes wonder what would have become of the GDR if it had developed independently from its Moscow-loyal character into a separate, second German state.”

October 3 symbolizes “change through rapprochement,” a concept that was discussed in your generation. How do you view this approach today, at a time when global conflicts and national identities are being called into question?

At first, I viewed German reunification with great joy, even relief. In the early 1990s, I moved to a small town south of Berlin in Brandenburg, not far from the Polish border. My wife had founded a Polish limited liability company that produced construction chemicals in Lower Silesia, Poland. I quickly learned how different the attitudes of people in the eastern federal states are, where anything foreign is initially rejected. For example, when I entered a restaurant with my Polish friends, we were met with an eloquent silence. West Germans were considered foreigners and treated with suspicion. A stranger who did not speak German remained doubly foreign. I sometimes wonder what would have become of the GDR if the liberation from Moscow's influence had developed independently into a separate, second German state. Such an attempt at democracy has been very successful in Poland and the small Baltic countries, much more so than in East Germany. There was no big brother who knew everything better and harassed them, first destroying the structures with money and benefits and then rebuilding them. A big brother to whom they were supposed to be grateful, even though he wanted to destroy everything – especially their memories. How else can one explain the unproductive self-hatred of so many East Germans, who accept financial benefits?

The Poles and all the other former Eastern Bloc countries had only the support of the European Community, but no additional know-it-alls telling them what to do, and they didn't have to be grateful to anyone, because they took on the task of renewal on their own, rolling up their sleeves, and today they can rightly be proud of what they have achieved. As a European from the very beginning, I have seen how brilliantly small European countries in particular can assert themselves and develop within the European Union, and how difficult it often is for the larger European countries, which are also expected to provide leadership, to keep up with the speed and capabilities of smaller countries – we need only think of digitalization or the difficult adaptation of our society to new geopolitical realities. As the largest player in the European Union, reunified Germany has taken on a difficult role: it is supposed to lead, but in such a way that no one notices and no one gets hurt; it is supposed to remain the economic locomotive, but it should not close itself off from the loose fiscal policy of the southern member states, including France, and should even join in; it should not show off, because there is a certain amount of fear of a state that dominates the other members. Wouldn't it be much easier and more successful for the two German states, the FRG and the GDR, to remain two states and trust each other in this form, inspiring and engaging with each other? The European project does not require the size of its members, but the participation of each individual citizen.

“The geopolitical situation has changed dramatically, and we have been reminded that war, conquest, and oppression are historical constants in all cultures.”

How has writing about your experiences helped you understand the fractures in German history, and what are your hopes for Germany's future on the 35th anniversary of reunification?

In October 1981, at our large demonstration against nuclear armament in Bonn's Hofgarten, we chanted “Create peace without weapons!” This was our credo until the 1990s. Only the mutual threat between East and West kept the world in relative peace and balance. For a long time, this fact alone was the basis for peace between East and West. For decades, up to 5% of the gross national product at the time was spent by the former Federal Republic of Germany on security, armaments, and the Bundeswehr until the end of the 1980s, and no one found anything wrong with that. On the contrary: it allowed us to be comfortable apostles of peace, and for a long time the majority of the population considered this a policy of improving the world. But only as long as the mutual balance was maintained. How naive can you be! I liked to be a dreamer and wrote poems for an unarmed society.

Together with the many who, like me, wanted to believe in eternal peace, we later, since the late 2000s, prevented the establishment of a defense against all reason and always protested loudly against such plans. The issue needs to be reassessed. The geopolitical situation has changed dramatically, and we have been reminded that war, conquest, and oppression are historical constants in all cultures. It is worth remembering what the purpose of defense readiness is. It is to avert harm. It is not a principle for its own sake, but rather serves a purpose. Its guiding principle is a single question: Does it make the country and its people safer? If the answer to this question is no, then defense readiness is obsolete. The fact that the reduction of the Bundeswehr and the dismantling of weapons has been a long-standing tradition in Germany for several decades is not a sufficient reason to stick to it. On the 35th anniversary of German reunification, I would like to see some understanding: now is the time to create added value in terms of security. And not just with money. Rather, it is about creating a new awareness of the tasks of society.

“As a patriot of this world, I want to continue to trust my feelings and my mind and listen to my inner voice.”

What is your view of cultural diversity in Germany today, especially in the context of October 3?

The debate about remembering German reunification is actually rather superficial. What is really changing is society. It is precisely the non-German or not-yet-German citizens and residents of this country, with their different religions and customs, values and attitudes to life, who urgently need to know what it is that holds this country together at its core, the country that has become their new home. The country is increasingly suffering from debates about the spirit of the times that sour existence. In addition to the German language as a homeland, there is an unspoken German culture in everyday life that everyone who lives here perceives and everyone who comes from outside feels in a sense of alienation. Of course, it is not easy to define, but it is evident in how people interact with each other, debate, and what they eat; in a history that is collectively called “German history”; in concepts of closeness and distance, of public and private life. If there were no German culture, there would be no need to preserve it.

Yes, it could be that simple. If only we wanted it to be. If only we could finally shed our ingrained reflexes, on both the left and the right. If only the omnipresent structural moralism were no longer needed as a substitute religion, as a stopgap for self-confidence and raison d'état, even though it has more in common with nationalistic megalomania than one would like. It will take time, and who knows, perhaps in the end the immigrants, among whom there would certainly be many “new Germans,” will force the “old Germans” to develop the shared self-confidence of a modern nation. Simply because there is no other way. That would then almost be a historical-dialectical process again. As a patriot of this world, I want to continue to trust my feelings and my intellect and listen to my inner voice. 

“Therefore, let us participate in the tasks of the present. And we can only do that with guidelines that transcend our own time, in order to know who we want to be.”

What message would you like to convey to the young generation experiencing October 3, 2025, with your book?

It may be that the greatest danger to Germany and the European project does not come from outside, but from ourselves and the West itself. From its capacity for self-criticism, which is its greatest strength, but can become a weakness when exploited. From a left wing that, spurred on by postcolonial criticism, casts blanket suspicion on Western heritage. From a right wing that rejects universalist principles and disparages democracy. And from a society that no longer values and protects freedom because it takes it for granted. Therefore: Let us participate in the tasks of the present. And we can only do that with guidelines that transcend our own time, so that we know who we want to be.

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